Table Saw Kickback, Spoliation, and the Litigation Advance

Ravi's strongest design theory is that the saw lacked an effective riving knife or anti-kickback pawls as sold, and that the misaligned arbor increased the risk of kickback. A design-defect claim under Michigan law requires proof that the product was not reasonably safe and that a reasonable alternative design would have reduced the risk. The missing riving knife and pawls are strong evidence of a safer alternative. The failure-to-warn claim is weaker because the manual warned to use both the guard and the riving knife, and the danger of a spinning blade is obvious. The manufacturer will argue misuse: Ravi removed the guard and failed to install the riving knife. Michigan law bars recovery for unforeseeable misuse, but a jury could find that removal of guards is a foreseeable misuse that the manufacturer should have designed against. The obvious-danger doctrine may defeat the warning claim, but it does not automatically defeat a design-defect claim. The misaligned arbor is a manufacturing defect if it existed when the saw left the factory; the expert should rule out wear and tear. The employer's purchase and the saw's age matter. The claim is viable on design and manufacturing theories, but misuse and obvious-danger defenses make it a jury case.

Spoliation is a serious problem. A party has a duty to preserve evidence once litigation is reasonably anticipated. Ravi's attorney controlled the saw after the accident and returned it to Ravi without a preservation agreement or warning. Ravi then destroyed it. The manufacturer is prejudiced because it cannot inspect the arbor alignment, the missing pawls, or the guard. Michigan courts may impose sanctions ranging from an adverse inference to exclusion of evidence to dismissal. The court will consider the degree of prejudice, whether the destruction was intentional, and whether a less severe sanction will cure the prejudice. Because the expert already inspected and photographed the saw, the court may allow the expert's findings but give an adverse inference instruction that the saw would have been unfavorable to Ravi. Dismissal is possible but is a last resort. The attorney may also face a malpractice claim and a disciplinary complaint for failing to preserve evidence. The attorney should document the chain of custody, produce all photos and notes, and offer a stipulation about the saw's condition. The best response is to cooperate, not to hide the destruction.

MRPC 1.8(e) permits a lawyer to advance court costs and litigation expenses, with repayment contingent on the outcome. The $18,000 expert fee is a litigation expense and is permissible if the client remains ultimately liable for costs if there is a recovery and the agreement is in writing. The $6,000 rent payment is a living expense and is not permissible under MRPC 1.8(e); the lawyer should not have paid it. The contingent-fee agreement must be in writing and signed by the client and must state the percentage, whether costs are deducted before or after the fee, and how the fee is calculated. 'One-third of the gross recovery' without a costs provision is ambiguous and may violate MRPC 1.5(c). The lawyer should obtain a written clarification before settlement. On a $1 million policy limit, a one-third gross fee is $333,333; if costs are deducted first, the fee is lower. The lawyer must also resolve the $6,000 advance: it cannot be repaid from the settlement as a living expense, but the expert fee can be reimbursed as a cost if the agreement says so. The lawyer should not communicate with the manufacturer's adjuster if the company is represented by counsel; all contact should go through counsel under MRPC 4.2. Finally, the lawyer should advise Ravi in writing about the spoliation risk before settlement.