MI PT Juris common mistakes
MI PT Juris · Understand the traps and how to avoid them.
Treating Michigan's no-fault 'serious impairment of body function' threshold as if it were the old common-law 'serious injury' test, and arguing pain severity alone proves a threshold injury.
Candidates carry over general negligence habits and assume any significant injury clears the tort threshold, missing that MCL 500.3135 requires an objectively manifested impairment of an important body function that affects the person's general ability to lead a normal life.
What to do instead
Build a threshold checklist from MCL 500.3135 and the McCormick framework: objectively manifested impairment, of an important body function, affecting general ability to live normally. For each element, identify the specific record evidence (imaging, physician testimony, functional limitations) that satisfies it before discussing damages.
Suing the individual employee-driver alone in a course-of-employment auto case, or naming the employer without pleading respondeat superior and the no-fault priority rules.
Candidates conflate tort vicarious liability with no-fault first-party priority and forget that MCL 500.3114 and 500.3172 (assigned claims) determine who pays PIP benefits, while tort liability against an employer requires scope-of-employment proof.
What to do instead
Separate the analysis into two tracks: (1) PIP priority under MCL 500.3114/3115 and assigned claims under 500.3172; (2) third-party tort liability, pleading respondeat superior with facts showing the employee was acting within the scope of employment. Address each in a distinct section of the answer.
Conflating the notice-of-intent requirements for medical malpractice with ordinary negligence pleading, and filing suit without the required affidavit of merit or notice.
Candidates memorize the general statute of limitations but overlook MCL 600.2912b (notice of intent, 182-day waiting period) and MCL 600.2912d (affidavit of merit), which are procedural prerequisites that can doom an otherwise valid claim.
What to do instead
Create a malpractice-specific timeline: notice of intent served, 182-day waiting period, affidavit of merit filed with the complaint, and the statute of limitations under MCL 600.5805 and 600.5838a. Check each step against the file dates before drafting.
Analyzing governmental immunity by asking only whether the defendant is a government entity, without identifying the specific statutory exception and whether the activity was discretionary or ministerial.
Candidates treat immunity as a single yes/no question and miss the MCL 691.1407 structure: governmental function immunity, the six statutory exceptions (highway, building, public highway defect, motor vehicle, proprietary function, and public hospital), and the discretionary/ministerial distinction for individual employees.
What to do instead
Use a two-step framework: (1) Is the entity engaged in a governmental function? If yes, immunity applies unless a statutory exception under MCL 691.1402–1406a fits; (2) For individual employees, apply the MCL 691.1407(2) gross negligence and discretionary-act test. State the exception by name and cite the subsection.
Treating comparative fault as a complete bar or ignoring Michigan's modified comparative fault rule and the statutory cap on noneconomic damages.
Candidates mix Michigan with pure comparative or contributory negligence jurisdictions and forget MCL 600.2959 (reduction of damages by comparative fault) and MCL 600.1483 (noneconomic damages cap), so the damages calculation is wrong.
What to do instead
State the rule explicitly: Michigan uses modified comparative fault under MCL 600.2959, reducing damages in proportion to fault, and the noneconomic cap under MCL 600.1483 applies in specified cases. Show the arithmetic: gross damages, fault percentage, reduction, then cap application.
Answering a premises liability question using general negligence 'reasonable care' language instead of the landowner's specific duty categories (trespasser, licensee, invitee) and the open-and-obvious danger doctrine.
Candidates default to a generic duty-of-care analysis and miss that Michigan premises law turns on the entrant's status and on whether the danger was open and obvious, with the special-aspects and foreseeability exceptions.
What to do instead
Identify the entrant's status first, state the corresponding duty (invitee: reasonable care to inspect and warn; licensee: warn of known dangers; trespasser: avoid willful/wanton injury), then analyze open and obvious and the special-aspects exception before reaching breach.
Confusing negligence and warranty theories in a products case, or failing to address the economic-loss doctrine and the statute of limitations/repose distinctions.
Candidates treat all product claims as negligence and overlook that Michigan recognizes implied warranty of merchantability under MCL 440.2314, the economic-loss doctrine limiting tort recovery for purely economic harm, and MCL 600.5805 and 600.5833 repose periods.
What to do instead
Separate the claim into negligence (duty, breach, causation, damages), strict liability where available, and warranty (notice under MCL 440.2607, merchantability, economic loss). For each, state the elements, the applicable limitations period, and whether the harm is economic or personal injury.
Ignoring the notice-of-claim requirement and the 60-day waiting period before suing a governmental entity, or missing the shorter limitations period for governmental tort claims.
Candidates apply the ordinary personal injury limitations period and forget MCL 600.6431 (notice of claim within 6 months) and the 60-day waiting period, which are jurisdictional prerequisites for claims against the state or its subdivisions.
What to do instead
Add a governmental-claim checklist: notice of claim filed within the statutory period, 60-day waiting period observed, and the applicable limitations period confirmed. Verify compliance before filing and plead the notice facts in the complaint.
Failing to apply the correct causation standard and to separate actual cause from proximate cause, particularly in medical malpractice and multiple-defendant cases.
Candidates state 'but for' causation and stop, missing the substantial-factor and proximate-cause analysis, and in malpractice cases the lost-opportunity and differential-diagnosis issues that affect causation proof.
What to do instead
For every causation question, write two paragraphs: actual cause (but-for or substantial factor, with the evidence supporting it) and proximate cause (foreseeability and the absence of superseding causes). In malpractice, address the lost-opportunity doctrine and the expert testimony required to establish the standard of care and causation.
Overlooking ethics rules specific to personal injury practice, such as solicitation, fee-sharing with nonlawyers, and the duty of candor when dealing with unrepresented insurers or opposing counsel.
Candidates focus on substantive tort doctrine and treat ethics as an afterthought, missing MRPC 7.3 (solicitation), 5.4 (fee sharing), 4.1 (truthfulness), and 1.5 (reasonable fees and written fee agreements) as they apply to contingent-fee PI practice.
What to do instead
Build a short ethics checklist for each fact pattern: who is the client, is there a written contingent-fee agreement, has there been improper solicitation or fee-sharing, and is any statement to an insurer or opposing party misleading. Apply the specific MRPC rule to the facts rather than reciting generalities.