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A 0500 Report and a Client Who Represents 30% of Revenue

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A 0500 Report and a Client Who Represents 30% of Revenue

You are director of operations for a Part 135 operator with a single Citation CJ3 based at KBOS and two crews. The crew finished a round trip at 2130 local last night. The client's travel coordinator has now confirmed a 0500 report for a four-leg day: 1.8 hours, 2.6 hours, a three-hour ground stop, 1.9 hours, and an added fourth leg of 1.7 hours requested at 1500 local - 8.0 hours of planned flight time, planned block-in at 1900. The aircraft's second GPS is deferred under the MEL with no effect on the planned approaches. The forecast at the third destination is 1/2 SM visibility with vertical visibility 200 ft, and the only usable alternate is 55 minutes away with the aircraft landing at minimum fuel if a diversion is required. The travel coordinator says the passengers have a hard commitment and asks the crew to “make it work.” The account manager reminds you this client is 30% of annual revenue. At 0700 the captain calls you and says he is tired and uncomfortable with the fourth leg.

1. Is the 0500 report legal? Compute the earliest permissible report time and show your work.

Read the worked answer

No. For unscheduled Part 135 operations, 14 CFR 135.267(c) requires each crewmember to receive at least 8 consecutive hours of rest during any 24-consecutive-hour period, and 135.267(d) fixes the start of that 24-hour period at the crewmember's report time.

  • Off duty: 2130.
  • Eight consecutive hours of rest: 2130 → 0530.
  • A 0500 report allows 7.5 hours of rest inside the 24-hour period that begins at 0500 and ends at 0500 the following day.

So the report must move to 0530 at the earliest - and I would not schedule the earliest legal minute after a fatigue call; 0600 gives a margin.

Then re-check the rest of the day at the later report time: 8.0 hours planned flight time is inside the 10-hour limit of 135.267(b), and block-in at 1930 gives a 13.5-hour duty day. That is legal for unscheduled 135, which has no separate duty-hour cap, but it is a thin margin with a crew that has already self-declared fatigue, and the company FOM may impose a stricter duty limit - check it.

The lesson to embed: schedulers must build trips backward from the previous day's actual off-duty time, not from the customer's requested report time.

2. The travel coordinator directs the crew to add the fourth leg and skip the alternate planning. Who has operational control, and what do you do?

Read the worked answer

Operational control rests with the certificate holder, not the client, the broker, or the travel coordinator. 14 CFR 1.1 defines it as the exercise of authority over initiating, conducting, or terminating a flight; 14 CFR 135.77 makes the certificate holder responsible for it and prohibits delegating it. A customer cannot direct a crew, add a leg, or waive a fuel or alternate requirement.

Practical response:

  • Reply in writing to the travel coordinator and the account manager: the schedule decision is made by the certificate holder, and the requested plan cannot be operated as filed.
  • Never put the crew in the position of saying no to the client on their own. That is the DO's job.
  • Offer real alternatives rather than a flat refusal: a 0600 report, dropping the fourth leg, a second crew, or a partner charter operator repositioning for the last leg.
  • Document the request, the reasoning and the alternatives offered. If the client walks, that is a commercial outcome you can defend; a deviation is one you cannot.

Commercial pressure is not a defense in an enforcement action, and the 30%-of-revenue argument is exactly the kind of pressure that produces accidents. Escalate to the accountable executive if the account manager keeps pushing.

3. The captain has declared fatigue and the destination weather is at minimums with a marginal alternate. Make the go/no-go call and justify it.

Read the worked answer

The call is no-go on the plan as proposed; rebuild the day.

Two independent risk factors stack here, and stacking is the point:

  1. Fatigue. A self-declared fatigue report is a stop signal, not a negotiation. Under an FRMS the crewmember's report is the trigger; the response is to remove the source (the fourth leg, the early report, or the crew), not to talk him out of it.
  2. Weather and fuel. A 1/2 SM / VV200 forecast at destination is an approach at minimums; a 55-minute alternate that leaves minimum fuel after diversion removes the margin that makes a marginal approach acceptable. There is no room for a missed approach, a hold, or a tailwind change.

Concrete plan:

  • Move the report to 0600 and drop the fourth leg, or hold the fourth leg until the crew has flown the first three and been re-assessed.
  • Brief a conservative fuel plan with a real alternate and a committed diversion trigger; if the forecast holds at minimums at departure time, delay to allow it to lift.
  • Confirm the MEL item has no bearing on the approaches actually planned (GPS #2 inoperative, WAAS/RNP capability verified).
  • Record the decision, the rationale, and the customer communication in the trip file.

A go/no-go that cannot be written down in three lines is not a decision, it is a hope.