Suspension Without a Hearing
The Transport Authority of Belmar licenses Kestrel Ride Ltd to operate 420 vehicles. After a newspaper publishes anonymous allegations of unsafe driving, the Authority's chair issues a 90-day suspension of Kestrel's licence. The suspension notice cites 'public safety' but gives no particulars. The governing statute, s 14, allows suspension where the Authority is 'satisfied that immediate action is required for public safety'; s 15 requires written notice and a hearing before revocation; s 18 gives a right of appeal to the Minister within 14 days, and s 19 provides that 'a decision of the Authority shall not be questioned in any court'. The Authority relied on an internal memo, not disclosed to Kestrel, recording two unverified complaints and a board member's conflict: his brother owns a competing taxi company. Kestrel did not appeal within 14 days but applies for judicial review after 30 days, seeking certiorari and an injunction. The Authority argues the court lacks jurisdiction because of s 19 and because Kestrel missed the statutory appeal.
1. Is the suspension amenable to judicial review, and does s 19 oust the court's jurisdiction?
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Issue. Whether the court can review the Authority's suspension despite s 19 and the missed appeal.
Rule. Judicial review lies against bodies exercising public functions. A privative clause is construed strictly: it may exclude appeal, but it does not exclude review for jurisdictional error, breach of natural justice, or abuse of power unless Parliament uses unmistakably clear words. The decision is a public safety licensing decision, not a private contract.
Application. Section 19 says a decision 'shall not be questioned in any court'. That is broad, but courts generally require clear language before finding that Parliament ousted the supervisory jurisdiction. Even then, an ouster clause cannot protect a decision tainted by bias or a breach of natural justice. The chair's brother's competing interest and the non-disclosure of the memo make the case a strong candidate for review. The suspension is a 90-day prohibition affecting livelihood and property-like interests, so it is amenable.
Conclusion. The court has jurisdiction; s 19 should not be read to bar review for natural justice or jurisdictional error. If it is a true ouster, it still cannot shield bias.
2. Identify the procedural and substantive grounds of challenge and assess their strength.
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Issue. Which grounds of challenge are strongest.
Analysis. (1) Natural justice: s 14 permits immediate suspension, but immediate action does not eliminate a duty to give the affected party the substance of the case and a chance to respond, unless urgency genuinely prevents it. The notice gives no particulars, and the Authority relied on an undisclosed memo. (2) Bias: the board member's brother owns a competitor; this is actual or apparent bias. (3) Relevant/irrelevant considerations: anonymous newspaper allegations and two unverified complaints are weak; the Authority may consider them but must verify. (4) Reasons: s 15 requires a hearing before revocation, not suspension; but the more serious the sanction, the stronger the procedural duty. (5) Subjective satisfaction: 'satisfied' is reviewable for Wednesbury unreasonableness or absence of evidence.
Conclusion. The strongest grounds are apparent bias and breach of natural justice; the no-evidence and failure-to-disclose grounds reinforce them. The public-safety urgency may justify a short interim suspension, but not 90 days without a hearing.
3. What remedies are available, and how should the court deal with the 14-day appeal period and the 30-day delay?
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Issue. Remedies and the effect of the 14-day appeal and 30-day delay.
Analysis. If the decision is quashed, certiorari removes the suspension; a declaration and injunction can restrain enforcement. The court may also order the Authority to reconsider. Damages are not available in judicial review. Delay: judicial review must be brought promptly; 30 days may be outside the usual promptness requirement, but the court has discretion to extend. The statutory appeal to the Minister within 14 days is an alternative remedy; courts often require exhaustion, but not where the appeal is to the same ministry and bias or procedural unfairness is alleged. Here the appeal period expired, but that does not automatically bar review.
Application. The court should consider whether the delay prejudiced the Authority; the trial is not yet held. The serious bias allegation justifies hearing the claim. The court can grant an interim injunction to prevent enforcement pending review.
Conclusion. Certiorari, declaration, and injunction; the court may extend time and excuse the failure to appeal, but should weigh the alternative remedy and any prejudice.