Compression, Reclassification, and a 2.5% Pot

An across-the-board 2.5% preserves the compression ratio - both ends move together - so the general increase cannot be the whole answer.

A defensible structure:

• Base layer (roughly 1.5–1.75%): across-the-board increase applied to all steps, preserving the council's commitment and the union contracts' general-increase provisions.
• Targeted layer (roughly 0.5–0.75%): a compression pool limited to identified classes where the supervisor-to-subordinate differential falls below an agreed threshold (e.g., less than 8%). Publish the threshold and the class list in advance.
• Deferred/structural layer: reclassifications that are legally required but unaffordable this cycle get a phased implementation schedule with a dated commitment, not a silent deferral.

Trade-offs to state explicitly to the council: a targeted pool means some employees receive less than 2.5%; the alternative is losing engineers at 18% turnover and re-hiring at market rates that cost more. Also flag the stipend precedent - recurring problems solved with one-time money create expectations and, in some jurisdictions, may be a mandatory subject of bargaining once established.

Distinguish the two actions, because they carry different obligations.

Reclassification (changing a position from one class to another) is generally a management right exercised under the classification plan, subject to the plan's own appeal and audit procedures - but it usually cannot be used to change a bargaining-unit position's wage unilaterally.

Compression adjustments change wages within a represented class and are almost certainly a mandatory subject of bargaining. The obligation is typically to meet and confer - not necessarily to agree - before implementation, and to bargain impact (effective date, retroactivity, step placement, effect on seniority and differentials).

Practical sequence:

1. Notify all three unions in writing with the data and proposed class list.
2. Offer meeting dates before the effective date; do not present the decision as final.
3. Check each CBA for a reopener, a compensation article, or a management-rights clause that speaks to step placement.
4. Confirm with counsel whether the jurisdiction imposes a hard impasse procedure (mediation/factfinding) for compensation disputes.

Also check whether the nurses' stipend created a practice or a contract term that must now be extended or bargained; the firefighters will raise it, and HR should have an answer prepared rather than improvise at the table.

Non-base levers do not fix compression, but they buy time and address the reasons people actually leave, which exit interviews often flatten into 'pay.'

Sequence by cost and controllability:

1. Step placement and hiring-rate discipline - the fastest lever. New hires at step 5 while incumbents sit at step 4 is a process failure, not a market problem. Audit every offer above step 3 for justification.
2. Differential-based tools - licensure and certification pay, professional development and conference funding, tuition assistance, student loan repayment where authorized. These are usually cheaper than 3% base and can be structured as non-pensionable.
3. Career architecture - a technical ladder that lets a senior engineer advance without moving into supervision. The compression problem is partly a symptom of a flat structure where the only promotion is managerial.
4. Work design - flexible and hybrid schedules where operationally feasible; these are typically bargainable, so raise them at the table rather than announcing them.

Caution: do not let non-base levers become the story. If the structural differential is not corrected within two budget cycles, turnover will continue and the retention programs will be read by employees as a substitute for pay - which is worse for trust than doing nothing.