High Risk Work Licence - Personnel and Materials Hoist (HP) common mistakes
High Risk Work Licence - Personnel and Materials Hoist (HP) · Understand the traps and how to avoid them.
Calculates the load by adding up only the materials, and never subtracts the platform's own weight, the persons riding or the spreader/attachment weight from the rated capacity, and does not read the capacity plate on the machine that day. The candidate then loads the platform to what they think is 'under the SWL'.
Candidates carry over a forklift or crane mindset where the SWL refers only to the goods, and they trust a figure remembered from training rather than the plate fitted to that particular hoist, which varies with platform size and mast configuration.
What to do instead
Before loading, read the rated capacity plate on the actual unit, then write the gross calculation down: platform tare + (number of persons × the rated mass per person) + materials + attachments, and compare the total to the plate. Do this on the plan, not in your head, and keep the worksheet with the shift paperwork.
Chooses the set-up position purely by how close it is to the work face, without checking ground bearing, slope, underground services, or the safe approach distance to overhead powerlines. Typical behaviour: base plate placed beside an uncompacted trench edge or under the service drop to the shed.
The candidate's attention is on access and productivity, and the ground and services are invisible or unremarkable, so they are never actively looked for. Site induction information about services is heard but not applied to this specific machine position.
What to do instead
Walk the exact position with a physical checklist before any assembly: bearing capacity and load-spreading pads, slope within the manufacturer's tolerance, drainage, services located and marked, and powerline clearance measured against the documented safe approach distances. Barricade the final footprint so it cannot be built over.
Performs the pre-operational check as a visual walk-around only: looks at the rope, gates and limit switches but never operates them. The upper limit, gate interlocks, emergency stop, alarm and communication are assumed to work because nothing looks broken.
Time pressure at the start of shift, and a misunderstanding that the check is about finding visible damage rather than proving function. Many candidates have never seen a limit switch actually trip.
What to do instead
Use the manufacturer's checklist and physically test each device: raise the platform until the upper limit trips, open every gate in turn and confirm travel stops, press the emergency stop under load, test the alarm and two-way communication, and record the result of each test, not just a tick.
Finds a defect during the check (frayed rope, cracked mast section, sticking gate switch, damaged guard) and puts the hoist back into service anyway, or says they will report it at smoko. Sometimes the key is left in and the machine is handed over to the next crew.
Fear of holding up the crew, plus a belief that minor damage is normal wear. There is often no clear understanding that the person who finds the defect has the authority and duty to stop the machine.
What to do instead
Stop, isolate, fit a danger tag, remove and retain the key so the hoist cannot be started, and report to the person in control of the site. Return to service only after a documented repair and a repeat functional check of the affected device; log the defect even if it is corrected the same shift.
Erects mast sections past the free-standing height, or omits some of the specified wall ties or collar connections because the tie bracket is slow to fit and the next landing is close. The mast is left tied only at the bottom and top positions.
Erection is treated as a race to reach the top landing, and the tie schedule is not carried on site, so nobody knows the required interval. Free-standing height is confused with the total height of the mast on the drawing.
What to do instead
Hold the manufacturer's erection sequence and tie schedule at the erection point, verify each tie and its fixing before the next section goes on, and mark the free-standing limit on the erection plan. A nominated person signs off each stage, and the mast plumb is checked within tolerance before power is connected.
Leaves the mechanical assembly incomplete or inconsistent: missing or mismatched pins, un-torqued bolts, a base plate not fully seated or anchored, rack joints misaligned, or damaged pins reused because they 'still fit'.
Rushing, mixed hardware from several containers, and no habit of a second-person check. Candidates assume a bolt is a bolt and that a pin that goes in is a pin that is safe.
What to do instead
Pre-count and inspect hardware against the parts list before starting, discard damaged pins and clips, torque fasteners to the specified value with a calibrated wrench, and have a second competent person verify every pin, clip and anchorage before the machine is energised.
Travels or lands with the platform gate or the landing gate open, or lets people step on and off before the platform is level with the landing and held. Often the operator keeps their hand on the control while a person is half in the platform.
Habit carried over from materials-only hoists where no one rides, and impatience at busy landings. The interlock is treated as an inconvenience rather than the last barrier.
What to do instead
Treat the gate interlock as a hard stop: bring the platform level within the marked tolerance, hold it braked, confirm verbally with the persons on board, and only then open the gate. Never move with any gate open, and never let anyone board or step off a platform that is still travelling or misaligned.
Operates with no exclusion zone at the base or at each landing, and with no agreed signal system: workers walk under the platform to collect a load, or the operator moves off an ambiguous shout from the floor.
Crowded sites and unclear roles mean everyone assumes someone else is controlling the area. The operator's view is often obstructed by the mast or the load and they rely on hearing rather than a signaler.
What to do instead
Barricade and sign the base and every landing before first travel, appoint a signaler where the operator's view is blocked, and agree one signal set (hand or radio) at the pre-start briefing. Everyone on site, not just the signaler, must know the stop signal and be entitled to use it.
Shuts down with the platform left at an upper landing, the isolator still on, the key left in the control and the landing gates untended, saying the next crew will use it anyway.
End-of-shift rush, and a mistaken belief that leaving the hoist 'ready to go' is helpful. Lockout is seen as a paperwork step rather than the control that stops an unauthorised start.
What to do instead
Follow the shutdown sequence every time: lower to the designated park position, apply the brake or parking device, isolate at the isolator, lock it and retain the key, close and secure all landing gates and the base enclosure, and complete the logbook entry before leaving.
Cannot describe or demonstrate the emergency lowering/rescue procedure, does not test two-way communication at each landing before the first travel, and keeps operating after the wind picks up beyond the manufacturer's limit.
These items are read once during training and never rehearsed, so they are recalled as vague statements rather than a sequence of steps. Weather limits are not checked because there is no anemometer on the machine or no habit of looking at one.
What to do instead
Rehearse the manual lowering and escape procedure at each shift briefing, know where the emergency release is and who is authorised to use it, confirm communication from every landing before first travel, and check wind speed at the platform height against the stated limit, stopping work when it is exceeded.