Designing a Constitution for Ashmara
After a 12-year civil war, the Republic of Ashmara is drafting a new constitution. It has 24 million people, 18 provinces, and an economy dependent on copper exports. The peace deal ended a system in which a directly elected president controlled the army, appointed judges, and could dissolve parliament. The largest ethnic group is 60 per cent of the population; a minority concentrated in three provinces is 35 per cent; smaller groups make up 5 per cent. Turnout in the peace referendum was 81 per cent, and 85 per cent endorsed a federal arrangement. The constituent assembly must decide between a strong presidency and a parliamentary executive, and between symmetrical and asymmetrical federalism. It has a two-thirds voting rule and a five-year transitional power-sharing government. Civil society demands an entrenched bill of rights and an independent constitutional court. The assembly asks: which design best prevents a return to authoritarian rule while keeping the state governable?
1. Would you recommend a parliamentary or a presidential executive for Ashmara? Justify your choice with reference to the civil-war legacy, the 60/35/5 ethnic split and the five-year transition.
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Given the legacy of a president who controlled the army, appointed judges and could dissolve parliament, I would recommend a parliamentary executive with a ceremonial head of state, a prime minister selected by the assembly, and a constructive vote of no confidence. This makes power collective and removable, reducing the personalisation that fuelled conflict. But the 60 per cent majority could dominate a purely majoritarian parliament, so the design must include proportional or reserved representation for the 35 per cent minority, a Bill of Rights, and a constitutional court.
A directly elected presidency is riskier here: it can recreate a zero-sum contest in which the loser has no stake. If a president is retained, the office should be weak, with no army command and no power to dissolve parliament.
During the five-year transition, a power-sharing executive and two-thirds voting rule should be entrenched. The aim is not efficiency alone but credible restraint.
2. How should the constitution combine federalism with minority protection? Would asymmetrical autonomy for the three minority provinces strengthen or weaken the union?
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Federalism should be symmetrical in national institutions but asymmetrical in cultural and regional autonomy. All 18 provinces need clear powers, fiscal transfers and a say in a territorial second chamber. The three minority-concentrated provinces should receive additional language, education and policing powers, but not a veto over national defence or the internal market.
Asymmetry can strengthen the union by answering the minority's fear of permanent central dominance; it can weaken it if autonomy is seen as a prelude to secession or if other provinces demand the same without a principled basis. The safeguard is a constitutional court, an entrenched Bill of Rights, and a fiscal formula that makes autonomy workable rather than punitive.
The 85 per cent referendum endorsement gives federalism democratic weight, but it does not settle the design. A negotiated, time-limited review after the transition would let the assembly correct imbalances without reopening the civil war.