Maharashtra HSC Philosophy cheat sheet

Philosophy (philo + sophia, 'love of wisdom') begins with wonder (Plato, Theaetetus) and with doubt about unexamined opinion (doxa).

Scope: metaphysics (what is), epistemology (what can be known), logic (how to reason), ethics, aesthetics, philosophy of religion, social-political philosophy.

Normative vs descriptive: philosophy asks what ought to be the case, not merely what is statistically common.

Socratic method (elenchus): pose a definition, draw out consequences, expose contradiction (aporia), revise the definition.

Dialectic: reasoning through opposed positions toward a higher synthesis; in Plato, ascent from opinion to knowledge.

Phenomenological method (Husserl): bracket the 'natural attitude' (epoché) to describe experience as given to consciousness.

Analytic method: clarify concepts and test arguments by logical form; synthetic/continental style stresses history and lived experience.

Philosophical claims are assessed by clarity, consistency, coherence with evidence, and explanatory power - not by experiment alone.

Ontology studies being as such; metaphysics also covers becoming, substance, universals, mind, and causation.

Monism (one ultimate reality), dualism (two, e.g. mind and body), pluralism (many basic kinds).

Substance theories: Aristotle's hylomorphism (form + matter); Descartes' two substances (res cogitans, res extensa); Spinoza's one substance with attributes.

Universals: realism (universals exist independently), conceptualism (only in minds), nominalism (only particulars exist).

Hume's fork on causation: we observe constant conjunction and temporal priority, not a necessary connexion; habit generates the idea of cause.

Kant's response: causality is an a priori category imposed by the understanding on intuition, so it holds of appearances, not things in themselves.

Aristotle's four causes: material, efficient, formal, final; modern science largely retains efficient (and sometimes material) causation.

Determinism holds every event is necessitated by prior causes; libertarian free will and compatibilism are the main replies.

Standard analysis: S knows that p iff p is true, S believes p, and S is justified in believing p (JTB).

Gettier cases show JTB is insufficient: true belief can be justified yet true only by luck; replies add a no-false-lemmas or reliability condition.

Rationalism (Descartes, Plato): reason is the primary source of knowledge; empiricism (Locke, Hume): experience is; Kant synthesises both.

Descartes' method of doubt reaches the cogito ('I think, therefore I am') as a foundation; the evil-demon hypothesis tests certainty.

Hume: all knowledge divides into relations of ideas (a priori, analytic) and matters of fact (a posteriori, synthetic); induction lacks rational justification.

Truth theories: correspondence (fits reality), coherence (fits a system of beliefs), pragmatic (works in practice), deflationary (truth is not a substantive property).

Scepticism: global (no knowledge at all) vs local (about a domain); fallibilism accepts knowledge without absolute certainty.

Sources of knowledge: perception, reason, memory, testimony, and introspection; each raises its own reliability questions.

Deduction: if the premises are true the conclusion must be true; induction: premises make the conclusion probable only.

Validity concerns form (conclusion follows); soundness = valid + all premises true; strength and cogency apply to induction.

Categorical propositions A (All S are P), E (No S are P), I (Some S are P), O (Some S are not P).

Square of opposition: A–E contraries (not both true), I–O subcontraries (not both false), A–O and E–I contradictories, I–A and O–E subalterns.

Modus ponens: p→q, p, therefore q (valid). Modus tollens: p→q, ¬q, therefore ¬p (valid).

Affirming the consequent (p→q, q, therefore p) and denying the antecedent (p→q, ¬p, therefore ¬q) are formal fallacies.

Informal fallacies: ad hominem, straw man, false dilemma, begging the question, hasty generalisation, post hoc, appeal to authority or ignorance.

Inductive methods (Mill): agreement, difference, concomitant variation, residues; abduction is inference to the best explanation.

Metaethics asks what moral language means; normative ethics proposes criteria of right action; applied ethics treats concrete dilemmas.

Consequentialism judges acts by outcomes; utilitarianism (Bentham, Mill) maximises total or average welfare; Mill distinguishes higher and lower pleasures.

Deontology (Kant): act only on maxims you could will as universal law, and treat humanity always as an end, never merely as a means.

Virtue ethics (Aristotle): eudaimonia through habituated excellences; the golden mean lies between excess and deficiency (courage between rashness and cowardice).

Moral concepts: right/wrong, good/bad, duty, obligation, supererogation, moral responsibility, and conscience.

Moral relativism (right depends on culture) contrasts with moral objectivism (some moral truths hold independently); Moore's naturalistic fallacy warns against defining 'good' by natural properties.

Kohlberg's stages: pre-conventional (punishment, self-interest), conventional (approval, law and order), post-conventional (social contract, universal principles).

Applied issues: euthanasia, capital punishment, animal welfare, environmental ethics, and professional/academic honesty.

Aesthetics studies beauty, the sublime, taste, art and aesthetic judgement; Baumgarten named it a science of sensory cognition.

Objective theories hold beauty is a property of the object (proportion, harmony, unity in variety); subjective theories locate it in feeling (Hume, Kant).

Kant's judgement of taste is disinterested, universal (demands agreement), and necessary, yet rests on feeling rather than concepts.

The sublime (Kant) overwhelms imagination through vastness (mathematical) or power (dynamical), evoking awe plus a sense of reason's superiority.

Aristotle's Poetics: tragedy effects catharsis through pity and fear; mimesis (imitation) is central to art.

Art theories: representational (imitation), expressionist (Tolstoy, Collingwood: art expresses emotion), formalist (Bell's 'significant form'), institutional (Danto, Dickie).

Aesthetic attitude (Bullough's 'psychical distance') and the intentional fallacy (Wimsatt and Beardsley) concern how we should view artworks.

The problem of ugliness: art can be valuable without being beautiful; the aesthetic covers the grotesque, the comic and the tragic.

Classical theism: God is omnipotent, omniscient, omnibenevolent, eternal and creator; deism denies ongoing intervention.

Ontological argument (Anselm): God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived, so must exist; Kant replies existence is not a predicate.

Cosmological argument (Aquinas' five ways): motion and contingency require a first mover and necessary being; Hume and Kant challenge the causal step.

Teleological argument (Paley's watchmaker): apparent design implies a designer; Darwinian evolution and Hume's Dialogues supply counter-explanations.

Problem of evil: Mackie's logical version (evil is incompatible with a good omnipotent God) and the evidential version; free-will, soul-making and greater-good theodicies reply.

Faith and reason: fideism (Tertullian, Kierkegaard: faith beyond reason), scholastic synthesis (Aquinas: reason supports faith), evidentialism (Clifford: believe only on sufficient evidence).

Religious language: verificationism (Ayer) rejects as meaningless; analogy (Aquinas) and Wittgensteinian language-games defend it.

Atheism, agnosticism and theism differ over belief and knowledge claims; Pascal's wager is a prudential, not evidential, argument.

Social contract: Hobbes (security under a sovereign), Locke (natural rights, consent, right of rebellion), Rousseau (general will, popular sovereignty).

Legitimacy of the state rests on consent, justice, or utility; anarchism denies any coercive state is legitimate.

Justice: Plato's harmonious order; Aristotle's distributive proportion; Rawls' two principles behind a veil of ignorance (equal basic liberties; difference principle).

Nozick's entitlement theory (acquisition, transfer, rectification) opposes patterned redistribution; communitarians (MacIntyre, Sandel) stress shared goods.

Negative liberty (freedom from interference, Berlin) vs positive liberty (freedom to realise one's true self, which Berlin warns can justify coercion).

Equality: formal (same treatment), proportional (relevant differences), and equality of opportunity vs outcome.

Rights: natural vs legal, claim vs liberty rights; duties correlate with rights; Mill's harm principle limits state power over self-regarding conduct.

Feminist and post-colonial critiques expose exclusions in the classical public/private split and in colonial accounts of sovereignty.

Orthodox (āstika) schools accept Vedic authority: Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya, Yoga, Mīmāṃsā, Vedānta; heterodox (nāstika): Cārvāka, Jainism, Buddhism.

Cārvāka: materialism, perception as the only pramāṇa, denial of afterlife and rebirth; noted for hedonistic ethics.

Nyāya: pramāṇas - pratyakṣa (perception), anumāna (inference), śabda (testimony), upamāna (comparison); five-membered syllogism (pratijñā, hetu, udāharaṇa, upanaya, nigamana).

Vaiśeṣika: atomism with six padārthas (substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, inherence).

Sāṃkhya: puruṣa (consciousness) and prakṛti (matter) dualism with three guṇas - sattva, rajas, tamas; Yoga adds Īśvara and aṣṭāṅga practice.

Mīmāṃsā stresses Vedic ritual and dharma; Vedānta sub-schools: Advaita (Śaṅkara, non-dualism, māyā), Viśiṣṭādvaita (Rāmānuja), Dvaita (Madhva).

Buddhism: Four Noble Truths, anātman (no-self), pratītyasamutpāda (dependent origination), anitya (impermanence); Jainism: anekāntavāda and ahiṃsā.

Key concepts: ṛta/dharma, karma, saṃsāra, mokṣa/nirvāṇa, ātman, and pramāṇa theory shared across schools.