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Duplicate Records and Post-Service Registration at a Two-Campus Hospital

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Duplicate Records and Post-Service Registration at a Two-Campus Hospital

Riverside Community Hospital is a 412-bed nonprofit operating two campuses under one tax ID. Access services are decentralized: emergency registration, six outpatient imaging sites, a surgery desk, and a central scheduling call center that opened 14 months ago. Third-quarter quality data show a duplicate medical record rate of 3.8% against an internal target of under 1%, and 41% of outpatient imaging encounters are registered only after the patient has left the building. Point-of-service collections average $9.40 per patient visit against a system benchmark of $38. In a random audit of 1,200 imaging records, 96 show the call center created a pre-registration account while the on-site registrar built a second record at arrival. Staff report that patient search fails for hyphenated surnames and common last names because the search is configured as exact match on the first three characters of the last name. Authorization denials on imaging rose 22% in the same quarter. The CFO has budgeted $420,000 for an identity-management module and wants the purchase approved before year end. The access director believes workflow, not software, is the problem and has 90 days to prove it.

1. Which root causes should the director address before any technology purchase, and what specific evidence in the scenario supports each one?

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Three root causes are visible, and each is documented by data already in hand.

1. Dual record creation across a handoff. The call center builds a pre-registration and the on-site registrar builds a second record. Evidence: 96 of 1,200 audited records (8%) show exactly this pattern, which is far higher than the 3.8% overall duplicate rate and points to a handoff failure rather than random error.

2. Search configuration, not search technology. The MPI index is set to exact match on three characters, which predictably fails for hyphenated names and high-frequency surnames such as Smith or Nguyen. Evidence: staff attribute the failure to search behavior, and the failures cluster in name classes that any matching logic should handle. Changing to partial/phonetic matching plus a minimum of two identifiers (date of birth plus phone) is a configuration change, not a capital purchase.

3. Registration occurring after the service. 41% of imaging encounters registered post-departure means eligibility, authorization, and collection cannot happen before the encounter. This single fact explains both the $9.40 point-of-service yield and much of the 22% rise in authorization denials, because no one is confirming auth while the patient is still present.

A $420,000 identity module layered on top of a dual-build process would simply link two records that should never have been created. The defensible sequence is: fix the search setting, impose a search-before-create hard stop, and assign one owner for pre-registration before any purchase is evaluated.

2. Build a dashboard of no more than four metrics the director should present at day 90, with baseline, target, and the reason each metric matters.

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Duplicate medical record rate. Baseline 3.8%, target under 1.5% at 90 days and under 1% at 12 months. This is the cleanest read on whether the MPI fix worked; it is measurable from the EHR without new spend and directly affects patient safety and claim matching.

Percentage of scheduled imaging encounters registered before service. Baseline 59% (the inverse of the 41% post-service figure), target 85% at 90 days. This is a leading indicator: it must move before point-of-service collections and auth denials can improve, and it tells the CFO whether the workflow change is real.

Point-of-service collections per visit. Baseline $9.40, target $22 at 90 days and $38 at 12 months. A staged target is more credible than jumping straight to benchmark, and the metric only counts if staff have estimates and scripts to collect against.

Authorization denial rate for imaging. Baseline up 22% quarter over quarter, target a return to the prior baseline and under 5% of imaging claims within two quarters. This is the lagging financial proof that pre-service verification is happening.

Present them as one story: registration timing drives both collections and denials, and duplicate rate tells you whether the identity fix held. Avoid adding volume metrics that cannot be tied to a decision.

3. Sequence a 90-day plan that improves performance and keeps the CFO's capital request alive rather than killing it.

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The director should not oppose the purchase; the director should gate it.

Days 1-14, baseline and governance. Publish the current duplicate rate by site, confirm the 96-record audit pattern, and stand up a weekly workgroup with the call center, imaging, and the EHR analyst. Name a single MPI owner.

Days 15-40, search and single-build rule. Change the MPI search to partial and phonetic matching with a two-identifier minimum, add a search-before-create prompt, and require the on-site registrar to search the pre-registration queue before creating a record. This is analyst time and staff training, not capital.

Days 41-65, registration timing. Move imaging pre-registration to a scripted call 48 hours before service, including eligibility verification, authorization confirmation, and a good-faith estimate. Track the percentage registered before arrival weekly.

Days 66-90, collections and measurement. Deploy point-of-service scripting and estimates at the two highest-volume sites, then re-measure all four dashboard metrics against baseline.

The capital request stays alive through a success gate: ask the CFO to release roughly $50,000 now for search configuration and interface work, and to hold the remaining balance pending a month-4 measurement. If the duplicate rate remains above 1.5% after the process fix, the module is justified on evidence; if it falls, the hospital saved the money and the director has proof that workflow was the driver.