Aerocivil Colombia UAS Remote Pilot common mistakes
Aerocivil Colombia UAS Remote Pilot · Understand the traps and how to avoid them.
Citing the general RAC as if it alone authorises a UAS flight, without identifying the specific Aerocivil resolution/category that applies to the operation (e.g., treating a beyond-visual-line-of-sight or over-people operation as covered by the same rules as a basic VLOS flight).
Candidates memorise 'RAC applies' as a slogan and never build the habit of linking a concrete operation to its authorisation basis. In practice the category, not the general regulation, determines what is allowed, so this shortcut feels sufficient until a scenario question asks which requirement governs.
What to do instead
For every scenario, first classify the operation (weight/MTOM, VLOS vs BVLOS, over people, urban, controlled airspace, night) and then state which category and which specific resolution/requirement applies before answering the question. Practise a one-line 'classification then rule' template until it is automatic.
Answering classification questions using only the aircraft's maximum takeoff weight, ignoring the operational criteria (visual line of sight, altitude/height limits, overflight of people, populated areas, controlled airspace) that also determine the category.
Weight is the most memorable and most frequently quoted number, so it becomes the single decision axis. Candidates underweight the operational conditions because they require more reasoning and are less easily memorised.
What to do instead
Use a decision checklist: weight, VLOS/BVLOS, people overflight, populated area, airspace class, night. Answer only after checking all criteria; when two operations share the same weight but differ in conditions, expect the answer to differ too.
Assuming that because a flight is below 120 m (or another common altitude limit) it is automatically legal in controlled airspace or near an aerodrome, without checking authorisation, ATC coordination, or published restrictions.
The altitude limit is taught as the headline rule, so candidates treat it as a complete permission. They confuse 'below the ceiling' with 'cleared to operate', which are different questions.
What to do instead
Treat altitude, airspace class, proximity to aerodromes, and any required authorisation as separate gates that must all be satisfied. In scenario questions, explicitly ask: which airspace am I in, is coordination required, and is there a published restriction before selecting an answer.
Confusing aircraft altitude/height above ground with barometric or GNSS-derived altitude, or mixing units (feet vs metres) when applying limits, minima, or NOTAM/airspace data.
UAS interfaces often display height above takeoff point, while charts and regulations use feet AMSL or AGL. Candidates carry cockpit-style habits across without checking the reference datum, and unit conversion errors compound under time pressure.
What to do instead
Before any calculation, write down the datum (AGL, AMSL, above takeoff) and the unit. Convert explicitly (1 m ≈ 3.28 ft) and sanity-check the result against the chart or limit. Practise problems that deliberately mix datums so the habit becomes reflexive.
Treating battery endurance as a fixed number and planning the flight to that figure, without applying reserve margins, temperature effects, wind, payload, or degradation with age/cycles.
Manufacturer endurance figures are quoted in ideal conditions and are easy to memorise. Candidates plan to the published maximum because it is concrete, while derating factors are probabilistic and feel optional.
What to do instead
Always compute a planning endurance that applies a reserve (e.g., land with a defined remaining charge), temperature derating, headwind on the outbound or return leg, and payload allowance. State the reserve explicitly in the answer rather than quoting the brochure figure.
Reading a wind forecast as a single surface value and ignoring wind gradient, gusts, and the effect of wind on the return leg, then concluding the flight is within limits because the average wind is acceptable.
Candidates focus on the headline wind speed and do not translate it into ground speed, drift, or energy consumption. The asymmetry between outbound and return legs is easy to overlook when planning on a screen.
What to do instead
Convert wind into effect: estimate ground speed outbound and return, check gust spread against aircraft limits, and confirm the return leg is feasible with reserve. If the scenario gives wind direction, explicitly reason about which leg is penalised.
Responding to a lost command-and-control link by continuing to troubleshoot the control station or waiting for reconnection, instead of applying the pre-briefed lost-link procedure (hold, return-to-home, or land as programmed).
In simulators and training the link usually returns, so candidates learn that waiting works. Under exam pressure, 'try to reconnect' sounds like the responsible answer even though the correct behaviour is to let the automated contingency execute and prepare for the outcome.
What to do instead
Memorise the lost-link contingency as a fixed sequence: what the aircraft does automatically, what the remote pilot does, and what triggers manual intervention. Answer lost-link questions by naming the programmed behaviour first, then the pilot's monitoring role.
Choosing the most technically advanced action in an emergency (e.g., attempting a complex manual recovery) rather than the safest available option such as landing immediately in a clear area or activating the emergency parachute/flight termination system.
Candidates equate competence with complexity and fear that 'land now' looks like giving up. Exam scenarios reward risk minimisation, not technical heroics, and this mismatch is a frequent source of wrong answers.
What to do instead
Rank options by outcome severity: protect people and third parties first, then the aircraft. Prefer the simple, pre-briefed action unless a specific condition clearly requires otherwise. Practise emergency scenarios where the 'boring' answer is correct.
Using incorrect or incomplete radiotelephony phraseology, or failing to read back clearances and hold-short instructions, when operating in or near controlled airspace.
UAS pilots often have limited live radio practice, so they answer phraseology questions by meaning rather than by standard wording. Read-back is skipped because it feels like repetition rather than a safety requirement.
What to do instead
Learn the standard call structure (who you are calling, who you are, position/altitude, request) and always read back clearances, hold-short instructions, and frequency changes. Rehearse short scripted exchanges aloud until the wording is automatic.
Failing to apply human-factors concepts to a concrete scenario: attributing a fatigue or distraction error to 'carelessness', or ignoring confirmation bias and plan continuation when a flight should be aborted.
Human factors are studied as definitions and lists, not as tools for interpreting behaviour. Candidates can recite 'fatigue degrades performance' but cannot map it onto a described situation, so they default to moral explanations.
What to do instead
For each human-factors scenario, name the specific mechanism (fatigue, expectation bias, plan continuation, channelised attention, poor situational awareness) and the specific countermeasure (checklist, cross-check, pre-briefed abort criteria, rest). Answer with mechanism plus mitigation, not a character judgement.